The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental Health Care by Ramage, Wayne E.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 1992 Article 6 
5-1992 
The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental Health Care 
Wayne E. Ramage 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wayne E. Ramage, The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for Mental Health Care, 45 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 951 (1992) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol45/iss4/6 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more 
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
The Pariah Patient: The Lack of Funding for
Mental Health Care
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................... 951
II. MENTAL ILLNESS: THE STATUS Quo ........ 953
A. The Prevalence of Mental Illness ............... 953
B. Mental Illness Among the Homeless ............ 954
C. The Failure of Public and Private Insurance Pro-
grams ............................ .... 955
III. INDIRECT FUNDING By HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS ...... 958
A. The Common-Law Duty ........................ 958
B. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act ................................. 960
IV. THIRD- AND FOURTH-PARTY PAYORS ..................... 963
A. Benefits Limitations in Private Insurance Con-
tracts ......................... : ............... 963
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act ............ 968
C. Stigmatization and Prioritization in Health Care
Funding .................................. 972
V . CONCLUSION ........................................ 975
I. INTRODUCTION
In all the furor over the provision of health care in the United
States-especially over who will pay for the skyrocketing costs of medi-
cal treatment-one class of patient appears to have been overlooked:
the mentally ill. This oversight is not new; Anglo-American society his-
torically has viewed the mentally ill as outsiders. In England, for exam-
ple, inmates at the infamous "Bedlam" hospital for the insane often
were displayed for the amusement of the paying public.' Society's dis-
dain of the mentally ill still exists2 and has led to public neglect of
these unfortunates, especially in the provision of mental health care. s
1. Rael J. Isaac and Virginia C. Armat, Madness in the Streets: How Psychiatry & the Law
Abandoned the Mentally Ill 1 (Free Press, 1990).
2. For example, a gang of teenage boys in Los Angeles, California, advertises itself as the
"Trollbusters" because of its members' stated purpose of expelling (sometimes violently) the
homeless, of which a large percentage are mentally ill, from the local community. Similar behavior
has been documented in other cities. Id. at 1-2.
3. Only one fifth of the mentally ill receive care. Statement by Lewis L. Judd, M.D., Chair-
man of the National Mental Health Leadership Forum, at a public hearing on the homeless and
the mentally ill, quoted in Deborah S. Pinkney, Public Hearing Focuses on Homeless Mentally Ill,
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Since the process of deinstitutionalization first began, the law has
been involved intimately with mental illness.4 In the 1960s scholars crit-
icized the intellectual foundations of psychiatry,5 and numerous law-
suits sought to abolish involuntary commitment.' These early critics
primarily wanted to protect the right to refuse treatment; specific
targets were the somatic treatments for major mental illnesses, particu-
larly psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy, and psychoactive drugs.7
Some advocates for the mentally ill continue to fight for freedom from
treatment,8 while others have adopted a more cautious approach.9
As with health care in general one of the most difficult mental
health care questions facing American society in the 1990s is: Who will
fund the rapidly increasing cost of care? This Note examines the role of
the private sector in funding emergency and longer-term care for the
mentally ill. Part II describes the magnitude of the mental health prob-
lem in the United States and documents the failure of public and pri-
vate insurance programs to fund mental health care adequately. Part
III examines indirect funding by primary health care providers and sug-
gests that Congress expand existing federal law to require hospitals and
physicians to provide emergency care to the mentally ill who present a
danger to themselves or others. Part IV examines direct funding by pri-
vate insurance, focusing on the continuing validity of mental illness
benefits-limitation clauses under common and federal law. Part V con-
cludes that any alternative system likely will perpetuate the inadequate
level of mental health care currently provided, unless the stigma associ-
ated with mental illness can be overcome by special recognition of the
seriousness and treatability of mental illness.
Am. Med. News 2 (Sept. 23/30, 1991) ("Public Hearing").
4. The antipsychiatric movement, deinstitutionalization, and the rise of the mental health
bar are documented in Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 19-124 (cited in note 1). See
also notes 32-37 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between deinstitutionalization
and mental health care funding).
5. See Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 113-15. For example, a student note pub-
lished in 1974 argued that mental illness should qualify as a suspect classification. See Note,
Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 Yale L.J. 1237 (1974).
6. Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 115-17.
7. Id. at 177-245.
8. See, for example, Note, The Nightmare of Forcible Medication: The New York Court of
Appeals Protects the Rights of the Mentally Ill Under the State Constitution, 53 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 885 (1987); Grant H. Morris, Civil Commitment Decisionmaking: A Report on One Deci-
sionmaker's Experience, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 291 (1988); Book Note, One Feud Over the Cuckoo's
Nest, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 528 (1988).
9. See, for example, Comment, An Involuntary Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment
with Antipsychotic Drugs: A Reassessment, 48 Ohio St. L. J. 1135 (1987). See also Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that the involuntary treatment of a state prisoner with anti-
psychotic drugs, without a judicial hearing, did not violate the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
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II. MENTAL ILLNESS: THE STATUS Quo
A. The Prevalence of Mental Illness
The term "mental illness" covers a broad range of psychiatric
problems, from relatively benign personality disorders to severe mental
or emotional disturbances that seriously interfere with such basic life
functions as self-care, employment, and interpersonal relations.' 0 At
any given time, one percent of the population of the United States is
being treated for severe mental illness." Schizophrenia affects from
one-half to one percent of the population of the United States during
any six-month period,'2 and has a lifetime prevalence of nearly two per-
cent.' 3 The lifetime prevalence of mood disorders, such as bipolar affec-
tive disorder, is around nine percent.' 4 There are approximately twenty
million schizophrenics worldwide, and over ten million Americans will
suffer some form of significant depression disorder at least once in their
lives.1 5 Although the majority of even the most severe mental illnesses
can be treated with some degree of success, as few as one fifth of those
with mental disorders actually receive care.1
Mental illness can be fatal. The suicide rate for persons suffering a
major affective disorder is fifteen percent, up to thirty times greater
than that in the general population.1 7  The suicide rate among
schizophrenics varies from five to ten percent, and longevity is reduced
by approximately ten years in comparison to the general population.,
10. Agnes Rupp, Underinsurance for Severe Mental Illness, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. 401, 401
(1991).
The official diagnostic manual of psychiatry, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (Am. Psychiatric Ass'n, 3d ed. 1987) ("DSM-III-R"), classifies mental illness by certain
diagnostic criteria along five "axes," each referring to a different class of information. Id. at 15.
Axes I through III comprise official diagnostic assessments: (I) Clinical Syndromes, (II) Develop-
mental and Personality Disorders, and (III) Physical Disorders and Conditions. Id. Axes IV and V
are used in special research and clinical settings to provide supplemental information useful for
planning treatments. Id. Axis I includes the severe mental illnesses: schizophrenia, delusional
(paranoid) disorder, psychotic disorders, and affective (mood) disorders, including major and bipo-
lar depression. For characterizations of each of these illnesses, see generally id. at 113-26.
11. Rupp, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 401 (cited in note 10).
12. Steven S. Sharfstein, Prospective Cost Allocations for the Chronic Schizophrenic Pa-
tient, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. 395, 396 (1991).
13. Rupp, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 401 (cited in note 10).
Lifetime prevalence describes the probability that a person will suffer from the illness at some
time in her lifetime.
14. Id.
15. Norman Sartorius and Giovanni de Girolamo, Preface, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. 371 (1991).
16. Statement of Lewis L. Judd, M.D., Chairman of the National Mental Health Leadership
Forum, in Public Hearing at 2 (cited in note 3). Dr. Judd estimates that eighty to ninety percent
of mental illnesses are treatable. Id.
17. Constance B. Caldwell and Irving I. Gottesman, Schizophrenics Kill Themselves Too: A
Review of Risk Factors for Suicide, 16 Schizophrenia Bull. 571, 571 (1990).
18. Sharfstein, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 395 (cited in note 12). Caldwell and Gottesman
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Mental illness is also dangerous to others. While most mentally ill
people are non-violent, mental patients on the whole have consistently
higher arrest rates and higher rates for certain types of violent crime
than the general population. 19 For example, the arrest rate for murder,
manslaughter, and assault of a group of patients released in New York
in 1973 was three to four times higher than the nonpatient rate.20 The
arrest rate of mental patients is usually close to that of the general pop-
ulation, however, for nonviolent crimes such as burglary, auto theft, and
larceny.2'
B. Mental Illness Among the Homeless
Mental illness occurs disproportionately among the homeless. A
conservative estimate indicates that between twenty-eight to fifty-six
percent of homeless adults-about twenty to forty percent of the men
and around fifty to sixty percent of the women-suffer some mental
disorder. 22 The inverse is also true: twenty-eight percent of a sample
estimate a comparable suicide rate of ten to thirteen percent among schizophrenics. Caldwell and
Gottesman, 16 Schizophrenia Bull. at 571 (cited in note 17). The risk appears greater for women
than men. Id. at 585.
19. Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 271 (cited in note 1). Mental health advo-
cacy groups often cite studies showing lower arrest rates for the mentally ill. These studies, how-
ever, primarily date from the earlier half of this century, when most of the mentally ill were
hospitalized and thus unable to commit crimes in the community. Id. Advocacy groups may seek to
minimize the prevalence of violence because associating the mentally ill with violent crime can
have stigmatizing practical consequences; for example, the fear of violence may motivate citizens
to resist the establishment of services for the mentally ill in their communities. Id. at 270-71. See
Tom Coakley, Group Home Plan Meets Protest, Boston Globe 21 (Jan. 16, 1992) (documenting an
intense citizen campaign against establishing a proposed group home for eight mentally ill men
and women).
20. The patient arrest rate was 12.03 per 1000, in contrast to the nonpatient arrest rate of
3.62 per 1000. Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 272.
21. Id.
22. Pamela J. Fischer, Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Problems Among Homeless
Persons: A Review of the Literature, 1980-1990 72 (U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
1991). This percentage can vary widely depending on the particular city surveyed. For example,
the percentage of mentally ill among the homeless is reported at twenty-five percent in New York
City, thirty-three percent in Baltimore and Los Angeles, and fifty-six percent in St. Louis. Isaac
and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 4-5.
The conclusion that mental illness and drug addiction are more common among the homeless
than the population at large is not unchallenged. See, for example, Note, Homelessness: A Histori-
cal Perspective on Modern Legislation, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1209, 1209 & n.3 (1990). A major part of
the dispute concerns the definition of "homeless." The prevalence of the mentally ill among those
living directly on the street is probably higher than among those living in marginal shelters. Id.,
citing a study reported in Peter Henry Rossi, Down and Out in America: The Origins of Home-
lessness 146-47 (Chicago, 1989). Other studies, however, have found an increased prevalence of
mental disorders in shelter populations. See, for example, Isaac and Armat, Madness in the
Streets at 4-6. Advocates for the homeless may be reluctant to admit the prevalence of the men-
tally ill among the homeless due to the stigma attached to mental illness. See id. at 2-5.
In general, the percentage of homeless women suffering from mental illness is usually higher
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group of New York state mental hospital patients had experienced
homelessness at some time during their adult life, while nineteen per-
cent had been homeless within the preceding three months.23
Unfortunately, few of the homeless with mental health problems
currently are receiving treatment.24 This may be due to the failure of
the mentally ill to recognize their need for treatment, mistrust of the
system based on prior experiences of inadequate care, or even irrational
fear characterstic of particular mental illnesses.25
Because of the disproportionate representation of the mentally ill
among the homeless, economic measures alone, such as programs pro-
viding jobs or housing, will not solve the homeless problem. Since their
psychiatric disorders prevent a substantial number of the homeless
from maintaining either jobs or housing, any proposed solution to the
homeless problem must address the provision of mental health care.26
C. The Failure of Public and Private Insurance Programs
The costs of mental illness are substantial. The total economic cost
of mental illness in the United States in 1985 was estimated to be 103.7
billion dollars, with direct treatment and support accounting for forty-
one percent of this amount.27 These costs currently are financed in the
United States through a combination of federal, state, local, and private
sources.
28
Historically, state-funded mental institutions were responsible pri-
marily for the care of the severely mentally ill.29 Despite the rapid
than that of homeless men. In Baltimore, for example, one study showed almost forty-nine percent
of the homeless women suffered from mental illness, contrasted with only forty-two percent of the
men. In one Boston shelter, approximately ninety percent of the women suffered from mental
illness. Id. at 5.
23. Ezra S. Susser, Shang P. Lin, and Sarah A. Conover, Risk Factors for Homelessness
Among Patients Admitted to a State Mental Hospital, 148 Am. J. Psychiatry 1659, 1661 (1991).
24. Fischer, Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Problems at 88 (cited in note 22). For
example, a Los Angeles study reported that despite a prevalence rate for chronic mental illness of
at least twenty-eight percent in a sample of homeless adults, only approximately eight percent had
had outpatient contacts with the mental health treatment system within the previous six months,
and only four percent had been hospitalized within the previous year. Id., citing Pamela J. Fischer,
et al., Mental Health and Social Characteristics of the Homeless: A Survey of Mission Users, 76
Am. J. Pub. Health 519 (1986).
25. Council Report, Am. Med. Ass'n Council on Long Range Planning and Development, The
Future of Psychiatry, 264 JAMA 2542, 2543 (1990). This type of behavior is most prevalent among
the mentally ill with paranoid disorders. See, for example, DSM-III-R at 118-20 (cited in note 10).
26. See Council Report, 264 JAMA at 2543 (cited in note 25).
27. Thomas G. McGuire, Measuring the Economic Costs of Schizophrenia, 17 Schizophrenia
Bull. 375, 376 (1991). The remainder is due to reduced or lost productivity (fifty-five percent) and
other societal costs, such as accidents, fires, and crime-related expenditures. Id. The costs of care
provided by families, primarily treatment and legal costs, are also substantial. Id. at 379.
28. Id. at 376.
29. Id. at 377; Rupp, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 402 (cited in note 10).
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growth of private health insurance in the 1950s and 1960s, this arrange-
ment persisted, perhaps due to the belief that mental health care was
too expensive to insure privately.30 In 1965 the federal government be-
came a significant contributor to mental health care funding when Con-
gress introduced Medicaid and Medicare in order to provide health
benefits to the poor and to the elderly and disabled, respectively.31
Advocates of the deinstitutionalization of mental patients accom-
plished during the past three decades expected that state and local
community programs would assume the burden of funding mental
health care primarily on an outpatient basis.2 While the number of in-
stitutionalized patients has decreased dramatically, the funding has not
followed the patients out into the community. While the portion of to-
tal mental health care costs expended for outpatient treatment has in-
creased, this rise is due to that sector's growth, and it has not resulted
in a decline in the costs of psychiatric institutions providing inpatient
treatment.3 3 Although publicly-funded outpatient mental health pro-
grams are now ubiquitous, they have achieved only limited success.34
The major problem is lack of funding, which often makes patient access
to the care provided by clinics difficult.35
While waiting for admission to a public program simply may be one
alternative for a mentally ill person with the financial ability to seek
immediate assistance from other sources, many others have no choice
but to wait, even though their need for treatment is just as immediate.
They cannot return to the state institutions because most state hospi-
tals are still downsizing and there is little room for new patients.36 Since
the mentally ill are disproportionately represented among the Ameri-
30. Rupp, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 402. The mentally ill generally were assumed to be in-
curable, necessitating life-long, expensive care. This assumption has not changed, despite major
medical advances in the treatment of mental illness. Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at
164-67 (cited in note 1).
31. Rupp, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 402.
32. Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 67-85.
33. McGuire, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 378 (cited in note 27).
34. Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 86-106, 287-308.
35. Waiting periods of over half a year are not uncommon. Id. See also David Ferrell, Team
is Scrambling to Help Mentally Ill, L.A. Times B1 (Dec. 20, 1990). The problem of long waiting
periods appears to be endemic to community and public health care in general. See, for example,
Elaine Herscher, Health Agencies Face Worst Cuts in Memory, San Fran. Chronicle Al (Apr. 15,
1991) (documenting that public health patients wait as long as three months for dental work and
over two years for drug treatment).
36. For example, the State of New York is seeking to reduce the number of institutionalized
patients in the state from 12,500 in twenty-two hospitals to 6,000 in about fifteen hospitals. See
Coming Back: Courage on Mental Health, N.Y. Times A14 (Feb. 3, 1992). Mental health and
church groups, fearing that the several hundred million dollars in annual savings will be allocated
to reducing the state's budget deficit, have introduced legislation which would direct a substantial
portion of the closure savings to community mental health programs. Id.
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cans under the age of sixty-five who are uninsured,37 they generally can-
not afford private care. This fact is not surprising since sixty-four
percent of Americans receive health benefits through employer-spon-
sored insurance programs and many of the mentally ill are not em-
ployed." Employment, however, does not guarantee health insurance
coverage since approximately three quarters of the uninsured are em-
ployed or are the dependents of employed persons.3 9
Moreover, general health insurance coverage does not guarantee
coverage for mental illness. Coverage for inpatient mental health care is
available for only 82.4 percent of the privately insured, and only 71.4
percent have coverage for outpatient mental health care.40 Even when
treatment for mental illness is covered, the benefits provided often are
subject to more limitations than other illnesses.4 Seventy-one percent
of the participants in the health plans of medium and large firms with
mental health coverage have more restrictive inpatient coverage for
mental health care than other illnesses.42 These restrictions often take
the form of shorter durations of hospitalization or lower caps on cov-
ered expenses.43 Ninety-five percent of the plans limit outpatient
mental health care to fewer visits per year than for other illnesses and
set special maximums on annual expenses. 44 In addition, the coinsur-
ance rate is often fifty percent for outpatient mental health care, rather
than the eighty percent rate common for other illnesses. 5
Public insurance programs also limit mental health care benefits.
Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) imposes a lifetime limit of one
hundred ninety days of paid care in psychiatric hospitals and limits
benefit periods to ninety days.46 Medicare Part B (Supplemental Medi-
37. The number of uninsured mentally ill people has been estimated at approximately
:300,000. Rupp, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 402 (cited in note 10). The number of Americans lacking
health coverage is estimated at 34.7 million as of 1990, with an increase of more than one million
expect in 1991. Harris Meyer, Report: Number of Uninsured Up to 34.7 Million, AMA News 5
(Jan. 20, 1992).
38. Richard G. Frank and Thomas G. McGuire, Mandating Employer Coverage of Mental
Health Care, 9 Health Affairs 31, 32 (1990).
39. Id.
40. Rupp, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 402 (cited in note 10).
41. Inadequate health insurance coverage for a given illness is known as "underinsurance," as
opposed to "uninsurance" (the lack of any insurance). Id. at 402. In regard to mental illness in
particular, underinsurance means mental health care coverage at levels below those provided for
other illnesses. Id.
42. Id.
43. For example, covered hospitalization for mental illness was often limited to thirty or




46. A benefit period begins with the first day of hospitalization, and ends when the benefi-
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cal Insurance) recently expanded its maximum mental health coverage
from $250 to $1,100 to bring coverage into line with that of other
chronic disorders.
47
Unless they are personally wealthy, individuals seeking mental
health care quickly run out of viable alternatives. If insured, they
quickly expend their mental health care benefits. If uninsured, the high
cost of mental health care quickly consumes their private resources. If
destitute, they face the shortage and delay of public facilities. Many
people needing treatment thus must go without.
III. INDIRECT FUNDING BY HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS
A. The Common-Law Duty
Although hospitals and physicians generally do not provide direct
funding for mental health care, they indirectly fund a portion of short-
term emergency care by providing unpaid and unreimbursed services.
The common law imposes a duty on physicians and hospitals not to
release patients who present a danger to themselves or others. Thus,
such physicians and hospitals are liable in damages for injuries to the
patient or others as a result of patient discharges in violation of this
duty.4s This liability, however, usually does not extend to consequences
that are unforeseeable or that occur at some distant point in the
future. 9
When a patient presents a danger to identifiable third parties, the
physician or hospital must take certain steps to protect those third par-
ties. In the leading case of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia,5° the court held that when physicians or therapists determine that
a patient presents a serious danger to an identifiable third party, they
must use reasonable care to protect the intended victim.5 1 Reasonable
care includes warning the third party or authorities, or, if possible, com-
mitting or hospitalizing the patient.2 Most courts generally have lim-
ciary has not used Plan A benefits for sixty consecutive days. Judith R. Lave and Howard H.
Goldman, Medicare Financing for Mental Health Care, 9 Health Affairs 19, 21 (1990).
47. Id.
48. See, for example, Semler v. Psychiatric Institute, 538 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding a
psychiatrist liable under Virginia law for the death of a girl killed by a probationer released as an
outpatient); O'Shea v. United States, 623 F. Supp. 380 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (imposing no liability if a
psychiatrist makes a professional medical judgment to the best of her ability); Martin v. Washing-
ton Hospital Center, 423 A.2d 913 (D.C. 1980); Bell v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp.,
90 A.D.2d 270, 456 N.Y.S.2d 787 (1982); Homere v. State, 48 A.D.2d 422, 370 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1975);
Greenfield v. State, 130 Misc. 2d 161, 495 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Ct. Cl. 1985).
49. See, for example, Bowers v. DeVito, 486 F. Supp. 742 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
50. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
51. 551 P.2d at 340.
52. Id.
[Vol. 45:951
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ited the duty to warn to identified victims or to those third parties with
which the patient has a special relationship. 3 Some courts, however,
have expanded liability to include cases in which danger to the public
in general is reasonably foreseeable.54 In response to the Tarasoff deci-
sion, a number of state legislatures codified the common-law duty, usu-
ally limiting the liability of professionals in a Tarasoff situation 5
By compelling physicians and hospitals to provide initial mental
health care to a certain class of mental patient, at least to the extent of
determining whether or not a danger exists, these common-law duties
provide a sort of safety net for the most dangerous manifestations of
mental illness. This safety net, however, is subject to varying standards
and enforcement among states. A congressional enactment establishing
in federal law a duty to provide emergency care would result in more
consistent and reliable care. The next section examines the most likely
vehicle for federal codification of such a duty.
.53. See, for example, Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp.
409 (D.N.D. 1967) (finding that the patient's wife had a special relationship); McDowell v. County
of Alameda, 88 Cal. App. 3d 321, 151 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1979) (recognizing that there is no duty to
warn when the threat is against the public in general); Hoffman v. Blackman, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (finding that the patient's son had a special relationship); McIntosh L'. Mi-
lano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979) (holding that a psychiatrist may have breached the
duty to warn an identified person of danger from the patient); Bradley Center, Inc. v. Wessner,
250 Ga. 199, 296 S.E.2d 693 (1982) (holding that a private mental health hospital had a duty to
exercise reasonable care to prevent a patient from killing his wife and her paramour); Bardoni v.
Kim, 151 Mich. App. 169, 390 N.W.2d 218 (1986) (holding that a psychiatrist has a duty to protect
a readily identifiable third party if the psychiatrist knows or should know that the patient presents
a danger to that third party).
For an argument that an affirmative duty to report suicide threats should be imposed on any-
one hearing them, see Kate E. Bloch, The Role of Lau' in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Com-
mitment-A Bystander Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 929 (1987). A few states
have even enacted statutory duties to rescue people or to report crimes. Id. at 947-48.
54. See, for example, Petersen v. State, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983) (holding a psychiatrist
liable for a pedestrian's injuries caused by a patient); Cain v. Rijken, 74 Or. App. 76, 700 P.2d 1061
(1985) (recognizing an issue of material fact as to the foreseeability of an automobile accident);
Rum River Lumber Co. v. State, 282 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1979) (finding liability for property dam-
age caused by an escaped patient).
55. Alaska Stat. § 47.30.790 (1986); Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (West Supp. 1988); 1987 Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-21-117; Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-4-12.4-1 to 12.4-4 (West Supp. 1988); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 202A.400 (Michie 1988); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.2 (West Supp. 1988); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 148.975-.976 (West Supp. 1988); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-1-1101 to 27-1-1103 (Supp. 1987); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 329:31, 330-A:22 (Equity Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14a-101 to -102
(Supp. 1988); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.05.120(2) (West Supp. 1988).
In addition to defining the duty to warn, some statutes also require physicians to take other
appropriate action such as hospitalizing the patient. See, for example, 1987 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-
21-117.
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B. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EM-
TALA) 56 was Congress's response to the increasing problem of "patient-
dumping. '57 EMTALA requires all hospitals that participate in the
Medicare program and provide emergency medical services to treat any
patient in a medically unstable condition, regardless of ability to pay.5 8
EMTALA provides for civil penalties against hospitals and physicians
that negligently transfer patients in violation of the statute.5 9 By its
terms, EMTALA applies to nearly eight-five percent of the hospitals in
the United States and its territories.6 0 EMTALA defines the term
"emergency medical condition" broadly to include any medical condi-
tion manifesting sufficient severity so that the absence of immediate
treatment would seriously jeopardize the patient's health, seriously im-
pair bodily functions, or result in the serious dysfunction of any bodily
organ or part.6' In enacting EMTALA Congress employed the same def-
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988). Congress enacted EMTALA as part of the Consolidated Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 ("COBRA"), Pub. L. No. 99-272 § 9121, 100 Stat. 164
(1986), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, and it frequently has been referred to by the acronym,
COBRA. Following the lead of several recent cases, however, this Note will use the more precise
acronym EMTALA. See, for example, Brooker v. Desert Hosp. Corp., 947 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1991);
Burditt v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991).
57. "Patient dumping" occurs when a hospital capable of providing needed medical care
turns patients away or transfers them to another medical facility because the patient is unable to
pay for the needed care. See Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpening the COBRA's Fangs,
61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1186, 1186-87 (1986).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. For a general history of common-law and state remedies for
patient dumping and a detailed analysis of the requirements of EMTALA, see Note, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1186 (cited in note 57), and Andrew Jay McClurg, Your Money or Your Life: Interpreting the
Federal Act Against Patient Dumping, 24 Wake Forest L. Rev. 173 (1989).
59. The maximum penalty is $50,000 for each violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(1) (West
Supp. 1992). Congress recently lowered the standard of liability, requiring only negligence rather
than a knowing violation. Compare id. (negligent violation) with 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(1)-(2) (Supp.
IV 1987) (knowing violation). A physician recently was fined $20,000 under the previous penalty
provision for knowingly transferring a woman in active labor. See Burditt, 934 F.2d 1362. Although
Burditt was the first case in which a court of appeals upheld a fine against a physician, the change
in the standard of liability certainly will lead to more such cases.
60. In 1986, about ninety-eight percent of the approximately 7,000 hospitals registered with
the American Hospital Association in the United States and its territories participate in Medicare,
and approximately eighty-five percent of these have emergency departments. Note, 61 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. at 1189 n.19 (cited in note 57).
61. As defined in the EMTALA, the term "emergency medical condition" means-
(A) a medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including
severe pain) such that the absence of immediate medical attention could reasonably be ex-
pected to result in-
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant woman, the health
of the woman or her unborn child) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or
(iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or part...
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A). The statute also applies to women in labor. Id. § 1395dd(e)(1)(B).
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inition of "emergency medical condition" as that then used by the
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP).6 2 ACEP's defini-
tion, in turn, had resulted from negotiations between ACEP and the
Department of Health and Human Services over the appropriate Medi-
care reimbursement standard.63 Prior to these negotiations, ACEP de-
fined "medical emergency" to include any patient suspected suffering
from a mental illness and posing an apparent danger to the safety of
him/herself or others."64 ACEP physicians consider the former ACEP
definition of "medical emergency" to be superior to the current one
Congress adopted for EMTALA6 5 The former ACEP definition is more
specific than its current counterpart.6
Congress should amend EMTALA to conform more closely to the
previous ACEP definition. Such an amendment would clarify the inher-
ent ambiguities6 7 in the current definition and would provide needed
guidance to emergency physicians. Providing physicians and hospitals
with an unambiguous definition of medical emergency is especially im-
portant in light of the recent change in the standard of liability. 8
62. Note, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1210 (cited in note 57).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1210-11. The earlier ACEP definition of "medical emergency" includes:
1) Any condition resulting in admission of the patient to a hospital or nursing home within 24
hours;
2) Evaluation or repair of acute (less than 72 hours) trauma;
3) Relief of acute or severe pain;
4) Investigation or relief of acute infection;
5) Protection of public health;
6) Obstetrical crises and/or labor;
7) Hemorrhage or threat of hemorrhage;
8) Shock or impending shock;
9) Investigation and management of suspected abuse or neglect of a person which, if not
interrupted, could result in temporary or permanent physical or psychological harm;
10) Congenital defects or abnormalities in a newborn infant best managed by prompt
intervention;
11) Decompensation or threat of decompensation of vital functions, such as sensorism [sic],
respiration, circulation, excretion, mobility, or sensory organs;
12) Management of a patient suspected to be suffering from a mental illness and posing an
apparent danger to the safety of himself, herself or others; or
13) Any sudden and/or serious symptom(s) which might indicate a condition which consti-
tutes a threat to the patient's physical or psychological well-being requiring immediate medi-
cal attention to prevent possible deterioration, disability or death.
Id. at 1211 & n.170, quoting ACEP Board Reviews Definitions of Bona Fide Emergencies, ACEP
News 1 (Dec. 1982).
65. Id.
66. See, for example, Note, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1209-14 (cited in note 57); Helene Hoffman,
Does Cobra Work? The Problem of Patient Dumping and Possible Solutions, 25 J. Health &
Hosp. 1, 6-7 (1992).
67. For example, Congress could clarify the term "serious." Note, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 1212
(cited in note 57).
68. See note 59 and accompanying text.
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Amending EMTALA explicitly to include mentally ill patients who pre-
sent a danger to themselves or others would ensure that such patients
receive emergency treatment regardless of their ability to pay. In con-
trast, the current definition may not include mental patients who pose a
danger to themselves and definitely does not require emergency treat-
ment of those who may endanger others.69
Adopting the broader definition should not increase the cost of
complying with EMTALA substantially, at least with regard to mental
patients, because the obligation to manage dangerous mental patients
already is imposed by the common law.70 It will, however, provide an
additional incentive in the form of possible federal civil penalties to en-
sure that the dangerous mental patient is managed properly. Federal
penalties are a more certain cost of failure to provide emergency treat-
ment to a mentally ill patient than a possible tort action subject to va-
rying state standards 71 and, thus, are a more effective deterrent.
Amending EMTALA to require emergency treatment of mental
health patients may impose more burdensome additional costs on
smaller, outlying hospitals, which often provide only limited emergency
services and are unlikely to have a full-time staff psychiatrist. It may be
more cost effective for these hospitals simply to close their emergency
departments entirely72 than to hire a staff psychiatrist to comply with
the statute.73 Alternatively, such hospitals could arrange to have a psy-
chiatrist available on call to provide treatment or to advise the existing
emergency staff in deciding whether to transfer the patient to another
facility.
Although requiring hospitals and physicians to provide emergency
care to mentally ill patients is vitally important and potentially life-
saving, such provisions still would leave a large number of nonviolent
patients in need of treatment but unable to afford it. Even those with
medical insurance soon exhaust their benefits due to the limited mental
health care coverage provided by most insurance programs. 74 Equalizing
mental health care coverage with that for physical illnesses would pro-
vide necessary mental health care, at least to insured patients.
69. While an argument can be made that posing a danger to oneself (for example, through
risk of suicide) is an emergency condition that could result in placing one's health in "serious
jeopardy" if untreated, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A), the threat of injury to others is not cov-
ered under EMTALA's current definition.
70. See notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
71. See notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
72. EMTALA already has forced many hospitals to reevaluate the cost effectiveness of their
emergency departments. See, for example, Hoffman, 25 J. Health & Hosp. at 7 (cited in note 66).
73. The median net income of a psychiatrist in the United States is approximately $107,000
per year. Mike Mitka, Doctor Pay Stalled for Second Year, AMA News 9 (Dec. 2, 1991).
74. See notes 40-45 and accompanying text.
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IV. THIRD- AND FOURTH-PARTY PAYORS
A. Benefits Limitations in Private Insurance Contracts
Many private insurers limit coverage for mental illness to a certain
number of days or a set monetary limit. Courts traditionally have con-
sidered these limitations to be valid contractual provisions. 5 Under
contract theory, the insurer and the insured have bargained freely, and
the insurer's responsibilities are limited to the contract's terms. Given
the freedom of contract principle, many courts likely would be reluctant
to extend the insurer's financial liability beyond the time limitation.
Benefits-limitations clauses may be subject to attack as contracts of
adhesion due to the unequal bargaining power between individuals and
insurance companies.76 This argument is most effective when the indi-
vidual is privately insured. Since the difference in bargaining power is
lessened when the insurance company bargains with the employer," the
final result may depend on whether the court focuses on the individual
employee or the employer.78 Even a large employer, however, still may
be in an unfair bargaining position if the insurance company dominates
or monopolizes the local market. 9 In many circumstances, the em-
ployer's options are limited to substantially similar plans with re-
stricted mental health care coverage.8 0
Clauses limiting mental health care benefits also may be ambiguous
or unclear. Since exclusions in an insurance contract are construed
against the insurer strictly and are interpreted liberally in favor of the
insured, courts typically resolve any such ambiguities in favor of the
insured."1 In Arkansas Blue Cross v. Doe," for example, the court sus-
tained the trial court's finding that bipolar affective disorder 3 was not
a mental illness within the meaning of a standard clause limiting
75. See, for example, Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Berry, 212 Cal. App. 3d 832, 260 Cal.
Rptr. 819 (1989).
76. See, for example, Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178,
131 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976).
77. See notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
78. Compare Jones v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 86 Cal. App. 3d 630, 150 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1978)
(focusing on the bargaining power of the individual employee) with Berry, 260 Cal. Rptr. 819
(1989) (focusing on the bargaining power of the employer).
79. See Note, Limiting Provider Participation in Health Insurer Reimbursement Decisions:
An Antitrust Cure for a Crisis in Medical Care Costs, 72 Georgetown L.J. 161 (1983). The author
states that "Ii]n some markets, effective employer choice may be impossible due to Blue Cross' or
Blue Shield's monopoly power," and points to a number of antitrust suits alleging monopolization
under the Sherman Act. Id. at 163 n.14.
80. Id.
81. See, for example, Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 539-40 (9th Cir.
1991); Berry, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
82. 22 Ark. App. 89, 733 S.W.2d 429 (1987).
83. Bipolar affective disorder also is known as manic-depressive disorder.
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mental health care benefits. The trial court distinguished between the
cause of the illness and its symptoms, stating that although the symp-
toms of bipolar affective disorder may be described as those of a mental
condition, the disorder's cause was biological and, thus, qualified as a
physical illness.8 4 The court rejected the insurer's argument that bipolar
affective disorder is a mental condition because it is classified in mental
health care manuals; nearly all of the expert witnesses agreed that such
classifications are made by symptom rather than cause.8 5 A federal dis-
trict court in Florida reached a similar result for the same disorder and
likewise refused to rely on the disorder's inclusion in the DSM-III-R.
6
Similarly, in Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance Company87 the
Ninth Circuit applied the rule of liberal interpretation in favor of the
insured to determine that autism was not a mental illness under the
terms of the policy."' As with bipolar affective .disorder, evidence sug-
gests that autism is an "organically based" disease that manifests
mental symptoms. Since the insurance contract failed to define "mental
illness," the court construed the term against the insurer.8 9
Not all courts have followed suit, however. In Equitable Life Insur-
ance Society v. Berry"0 the California Court of Appeals disagreed with
Arkansas Blue Cross and held that bipolar affective disorder is a
mental illness. The California court rejected the Arkansas Blue Cross
approach of classification by origin and, instead, focused on the illness's
84. Arkansas Blue Cross, 733 S.W.2d at 432.
85. Id.
86. Rosenthal v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 732 F. Supp. 108, 110 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
The district court stated that DSM-III-R is merely a diagnostic tool used by the psychiatric pro-
fession for treating patients, and the manual itself cautioned against any other use:
The purpose of the DSM-III is to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories in order
to enable clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat vari-
ous mental disorders. The use of this manual for non-clinical purposes, such as determination
of legal responsibility, . . . or justification of third-party payment, must be critically ex-
amined in each instance within the appropriate institutional context.
Id.
87. 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1990).
88. Id. at 535.
89. Id. at 537-40.
As noted above, the contra proferentem rule is followed in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, and with good reason. Insurance policies are almost always drafted by specialists
employed by the insurer. In light of the drafters' expertise and experience, the insurer should
be expected to set forth any limitations on its liability clearly enough for a common layperson
to understand; if it fails to do this, it should not be allowed to take advantage of the very
ambiguities that it could have prevented with greater diligence. Moreover, once the policy
language has been drafted, it is not usually subject to amendment by the insured, even if he
sees an ambiguity; an insurer's practice of forcing the insured to guess and hope regarding the
scope of the coverage requires that any doubts be resolved in favor of the party who has been
placed in such a predicament.
Id. at 540.
90. 212 Cal. App. 3d 832, 260 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1989).
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manifestation." The court also rejected the idea that any reasonable
layperson92 would view a person with bipolar affective disorder as suf-
fering anything but a mental illness.9
A recent decision by the California Court of Appeals in Wilson v.
Blue Cross of Southern California4 may herald a new line of attack on
benefits-limitation clauses. Howard Wilson, Jr., suffering from major
depression, drug dependency, and anorexia, was admitted to a Los An-
geles psychiatric hospital for treatment. Although the treating physi-
cian determined that Wilson needed three to four weeks of in-patient
care, the hospital discharged him after ten days when Western Medical,
a fourth-party medical utilization review company hired by the in-
surer,95 refused to approve payment for further treatment.9 " Twenty
days after his discharge from the hospital, Wilson committed suicide."
Wilson's family brought suit against his insurer, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield of Alabama; the insurer's sister organizations, Blue Cross of
Southern California and Blue Cross of California; Western Medical Re-
view; and the Western Medical physician who reviewed the decedent's
case. The plaintiffs raised claims of tortious breach of insurance con-
tract, inducing a breach of contract, and wrongful death. 8
Relying on an earlier California case, Wickline v. State,99 the de-
fendants sought summary judgment on every claim. First, the defend-
ants argued that liability for the consequences of a discharge lies solely
with the treating physician even when the patient is discharged because
an insurance company terminates benefits. Wickline had indicated that
the physician has the ultimate responsibility for a discharge decision. '00
91. "Manifestation, not cause, is the yardstick." Berry, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 824, 824 n.2.
92. The general rule is that terms in an insurance contract should he interpreted according
to a layperson's understanding. Id. at 824. Of course, the court then must determine what a layper-
son would understand.
93. Id. Both the Kunin and the Arkansas Blue Cross courts took a different view of what a
layperson's understanding would be. See Kunin, 910 F.2d at 542 n.9; Arkansas Blue Cross, 733
S.W.2d at 431 (stating that "most laymen, and actually I think most physicians and most people in
psychiatry now classify illnesses by cause or origin").
94. 222 Cal. App. 3d 660, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1990).
95. Concurrent utilization review, sometimes termed prospective utilization review, is the
"process by which an insurance company determines during a [patient's] hospital stay whether to
terminate the payment of benefits." 271 Cal. Rptr. at 881. Utilization review has been fairly suc-
cessful at reaching its goals of cost containment and reduction. Rex O'Neal, Safe Harbor for
Health Care Cost Containment, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 399, 406-07 (1991).
96. The patient apparently was not committable and voluntarily discharged himself.
97. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
98. Id. at 880-81.
99. 183 Cal. App. 3d 1064, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1986).
100. The Wickline court stated:
However, the physician who complies without protest with the limitations imposed by a third
party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise, cannot avoid his ultimate respon-
sibility for his patient's care. He cannot point to the health care payor as the liability scape-
1992]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:951
The Wilson court, however, rejected that portion of Wickline as mere
dicta. According to the Wilson court, the issue of whether the defend-
ants' actions were a substantial factor in causing Wilson's death did not
turn on the potential joint liability of the treating physician. 101
Second, the defendants argued that courts should not impose lia-
bility on insurance companies or their agents conducting concurrent
utilization review because of important public policy considerations de-
terminative in Wickline.1'0 The defendants apparently claimed that
utilization review served the public good by keeping mental health care
costs down.'03 The Wilson court, however, found that the clearly ex-
pressed public policy present in Wickline was not present in this case.
The specific statutes at issue in Wickline expressed a public policy
preference for utilization review only in state-funded programs, not pri-
vate insurance contracts."'
Finally, the defendants argued that a doctor who complies without
protest, with the limitations imposed by a third-party payor cannot
avoid ultimate responsibility for the patient's care.10 5 Again characteriz-
ing similar reasoning in Wickline as dicta, the Wilson court refused to
hold that a physician's failure to follow an informal procedure for re-
questing reconsideration by the reviewing agency immunized the insur-
ers and their agents from liability. 06
Under a straightforward interpretation, Wilson may be viewed as
goat when the consequences of his own determinative medical decisions go sour.
Wickline, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
101. The court observed:
This broadly stated language was unnecessary to the decision and in all contexts does not
state the law relative to causation issues in a tort case. . . . The legitimate rationale of Wic-
kline was that the normal tort responsibility principles in Civil Code section 1714 were modi-
fied were modified by the provisions of the California Administrative Code and the Welfare
and Institutions Code so that a Medi-Cal recipient was entitled to medical care within "the
usual standards of medical practice in the community" and that the discharge decision in that
case fell within the standard of medical practice. The language in Wickline which suggests
that civil liability for a discharge decision rests solely within the responsibility of a treating
physician in all contexts is dicta.
Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 880 (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 884.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 884.
105. Id. at 883.
106. According to the court, the Wickline
dicta has no application to this case. The present case involves a claim by a decedent's estate
and relatives directly against insurance companies and their agents, not against a physician.
In any event the failure of [the treating physician] to follow an informal policy allowing for
reconsideration by Western Medical did not warrant granting summary judgment. . ..
[TIhere is a triable issue as to whether the refusal to allow the decedent to stay in the hospi-
tal was a "substantial factor" in bringing about his death and the availability of an avenue of
appeal fails to prove as a matter of law that his demise was unrelated to his denial of benefits.
Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
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primarily a breach of contract case with no implications for the validity
of benefits limitations for mental health care. Wilson's Blue Cross pol-
icy provided mental health benefits for up to thirty days;"0 7 the failure
to provide coverage for up to thirty days alone constituted a breach of
the insurance contract. Moreover, since the insurance contract did not
provide for concurrent utilization review, Western Medical's determina-
tion was itself a breach. 108 The liability of the utilization review com-
pany, then, can be established through a simple application of settled
doctrines of vicarious or simple corporate liability. 0 9
A broader interpretation of Wilson, however, focuses on the deci-
sion's implications concerning tort liability for wrongful death due to
the termination of care. Under this view, Wilson and Wickline establish
that a health care insurer and reviewing agency may be liable for inju-
ries resulting from the wrongful termination of benefits. 10 The central
question then becomes what constitutes a "wrongful" termination.
Wilson demonstrates that wrongful termination includes the termi-
nation of benefits by a reviewing agency against the recommendation of
the treating physician who acts in conformity with the prevailing medi-
cal standard, at least when the insurance contract does not provide for
utilization review. The presence or absence of a review provision does
not appear to be critical, however. While the Wilson court refused to
hear the issue because the plaintiffs did not raise it in the trial court,
the court did note that Western Medical had failed to prove that the
denial of benefits was legally proper. Thus, even if an insurance con-
tract expressly provides for concurrent utilization review, the termina-
tion of necessary care by a reviewing agency against the
recommendation of the treating physician acting in conformity with
prevailing medical standards still may be wrongful. This certainly
would be true if the reviewing agency followed a policy of arbitrarily
terminating benefits after a certain period of time without any medical
or contractual justification whatsoever, assuming that coverage was not
otherwise temporally limited.
Incorporating a standard time limit into the insurance contract
107. Id. at 880.
108. The appellate court did not consider this argument because the plaintiffs did not raise it
in the trial court. Id. at 884 n.7.
109. See, for example, Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 377 Pa. Super. 609, 547 A.2d
1229 (1988) (finding an issue of material fact whether participating physicians were ostensible
agents of the HMO); Sloan v. Metropolitan Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104 (Ind. App. 1987)
(recognizing an issue of material fact whether the physician was an agent or employee of the HMO
to establish vicarious liability); Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill.2d 326,
211 N.E.2d 253 (1965) (finding that hospitals are liable for a wide range of factors affecting the
quality of care offered).
110. See Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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complicates the analysis by pitting contract law against medical neces-
sity. In this situation courts must weigh the potentially life-threatening
consequences of premature termination of care due to the cessation of
insurance benefits against concerns regarding the freedom of contract
and equity. The Arkansas Blue Cross and Kunin decisions appear to be
an attempt by the courts to avoid directly confronting this issue by os-
tensibly satisfying both sides of the balance.
The different conclusions reached by these courts demonstrate that
state court attacks on clauses limiting mental health benefits are likely
to produce erratic and inconsistent results. These cases are particularly
susceptible to small variations in state law and the findings of fact in a
particular case. A recently-enacted federal statute may provide a more
effective standard applicable to all insurance contracts.
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Certain provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA)111 may accomplish statutorily what state court litigation cannot:
establishing the invalidity of clauses limiting mental health care bene-
fits. Congress enacted the ADA to eliminate discrimination against peo-
ple with disabilities'12 in the areas of employment, public services, and
privately provided, public services."
3
The ADA defines disability to' include any physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties, a record of such impairment, or being regarded as having such
impairment."4 The limitations of major life activities that the ADA rec-
ognizes include caring for one's self and working,1 ' limitations charac-
111. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327-378 (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 - 12213
(Supp. 1992); 47 U.S.C.A. § 225, 611 (1991).
112. Section 12101(b) states:
It is the purpose of this chapter-
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards
established in this chapter on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the four-
teenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major areas of discrimi-
nation faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
113. See H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1990). See generally Evan J. Kemp,
Jr. and Christopher G. Bell, A Labor Lawyer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 15 Nova L. Rev. 31 (1991).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), (B), (C).
115. H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 52 (1990).
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teristic of most major mental illnesses.116
The ADA expressly prohibits disability-based discrimination in
employment.'17 Under the ADA, a "covered entity"'' l  cannot discrimi-
nate in the hiring or discharge of employees, employee compensation,
job training, or terms, conditions, and privileges of employment against
a qualified individual with a disability
1' 9 because of the disability.'2 0
Prohibited acts include subjecting the qualified employee to discrimina-
tion through the employer's contractual relationship with an employ-
ment or referral agency, labor union, or an organization providing fringe
benefits.' 2 ' The ADA also prohibits the use of standards, criteria, or
methods of administration that have the effect of discrimination or that
perpetuate discrimination.'
22
Although the provision of health insurance is a fringe benefit pro-
vided to employees, the ADA explicitly states that it does not restrict
the ability of insurance companies to limit benefits for disabilities such
as mental illness.'2 3 Most analyses of the ADA interpret its provisions
as not disrupting the current scheme of underwriting, classifying, and
116. See DSM-III-R at 12 (cited in note 10).
117. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
118. "Covered entity" is defined to include employers, employment agencies, labor organiza-
tions, and joint labor-management committees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). An employer is "a person
engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in
each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such
person"; for the first two years following enactment, however, the number of employees must be 25
or more. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5).
119. "Qualified individual with a disability" is defined as "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position that such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
121. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(2).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3).
123. The provision states:
Subchapters I through III of this chapter and title IV of this Act shall not be construed to
prohibit or restrict-
(1) an insurer, hospital, or medical service company, health maintenance organization, or any
agent, or entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from underwriting
risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with
State law; or
(2) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not inconsistent with State
law; or
(3) a person or organization covered by this chapter from establishing, sponsoring, observing
or administering the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that is not subject to State laws that
regulate insurance.
Paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the purposes of sub-
chapters I and III of this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
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administering risks.'24 The ADA's legislative history also supports this
conclusion. 2 5
An employer, however, could not directly discriminate against a
disabled person by denying her a job because the employer's insurance
plan does not cover that particular disability or because of an antici-
pated increase in insurance costs.'26 The ADA also prevents indirect
discrimination: the last sentence of Section 12201(c) provides that the
section may not be used as a "subterfuge" to evade the purposes of the
ADA.1
27
This provision may provide the key to the equalization of mental
health benefits with those for physical illnesses. A limitation on insur-
ance benefits for mental illness can be a "subterfuge" designed to evade
the purposes of the ADA because it specifically discriminates against a
protected class of disabled people: the mentally ill. While ostensibly ap-
plying to all employees, such a limitation would have a disparate im-
pact on an expressly protected group. For example, the clear limits in
coverage for mental health care, including more restrictive eligibility
and higher coinsurance rates might discourage the mentally ill from
working for employers offering such limited coverage. The ADA would
not prohibit disparaties in coverage that have a solid actuarial basis.
128
At least one court, however, already has rejected the actuarial argument
in the context of interpreting ambiguous clauses. 29 In addition, the
124. See, for example, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Law and Explanation 501
at 99-100 (CCH, 1990); Note, Addiction as Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics and Drug
Addicts Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 44 Vand. L. Rev. 713, 718 n.39 (1991).
125. H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1 45 (1990); H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 59 (1990); H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 70 (1990); H.R. Rep.
No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4 70 (1990); S. Rep. No. 115, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2 (1989).
For example, the House Judiciary Committee report states:
[W]hile a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on classification of risk would be
allowed under this section, the plan m[a]y not refuse to insure or refuse to continue to insure,
or limit the amount, extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a differ-
ent rate for the same coverage solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except
where the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles, or is
related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.
H.R. Rep. No. 485, pt. 3 at 71 (emphasis added).
126. H.R. Rep. No. 485, pt 3 at 71 (cited in note 125).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). Congress's use of the word "subterfuge" includes any "malicious,
purposeful or inadvertent" evasion of the antidiscriminatory principles established in the ADA;
this liberal use rejects the Supreme Court's more restricted interpretation of the term in Public
Employment Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), which required some malicious
or purposeful intent. Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diag-
nostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and Insurers, 17 Am. J. L. & Med. 109, 136 (1991).
128. See notes 123-25 and accompanying text. The burden of proof should lie with the em-
ployer and the insurer, as the employer's agent. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (recognizing business
necessity as an affirmative defense). An examination of the actuarial basis of mental health care
benefits limitations is beyond the scope of this Note.
129. See, for example, Arkansas Blue Cross, 733 S.W.2d at 432-33 (finding that the actuarial
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preference in current insurance plans for inpatient as opposed to outpa-
tient treatment '3" indicates that such limitations may not be financially
based on the experience of insurance companies, since the costs of com-
munity-based care generally are lower than inpatient care."'
Moreover, even a sound actuarial basis for an employer's argument
that expanded coverage would be too costly should fail, since an em-
ployer could save as much money by taking nondiscriminatory mea-
sures affecting all employees.' 3 Across-the-board limitations on services
that the majority of employees use more often do not discriminate
against a particular disabled group. Moreover, these limitations could
lower premiums at least as much as limiting mental health care alone.
Spreading the burden of providing health care for a disabled group
across a larger community is well within the expressed goals of the
ADA.1
33
If courts interpreted the "subterfuge" provision of the ADA as
mandating a certain level of mental health care, a large portion of the
cost of caring for the mentally ill would shift from tax-supported to
insurance-supported care. Such a shift has both costs and benefits to
society. By requiring a particular level of mental health insurance bene-
fits, efficiency costs will be incurred due to distortions in the labor mar-
testimony dealt with the entire field of mental illness in general, with no evidence as to how cover-
age for a particular illness would affect premiums).
130. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
131. See David Goldberg, Cost-Effectiveness Studies in the Treatment of Schizophrenia: A
Review, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. 453 (1991); McGuire, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. 375 (cited in note 27).
While it may be argued that private insurance contracts' preference for inpatient care is due
to the fact that outpatient care is more prone to fraud, recent scandals at psychiatric hospitals
indicate the contrary. See, for example, Susan Moffat, Industry Under Fire: Psychiatric Hospitals
in Crisis, L.A. Times Al (Feb. 2, 1992) (documenting that some psychiatric hospitals have misdiag-
nosed patients to hospitalize them and "milk" insurance payments); Peter Kerr, Paying for Fraud,
N.Y. Times 1 (Nov. 24, 1991) (reporting investigations of fraud in several psychiatric hospitals).
Nor is this type of abuse limited to mental health care. See, for example, Gorden Witkin, Dorian
Friedman and Monika Guttman, Health Care Fraud, 112 U.S. News & World Rep. 34 (Feb. 24,
1992) (estimating that health-care fraud costs between $50 billion and $80 billion each year). A
more likely explanation may be the perception that public mental health programs provide a form
of catastrophic mental health insurance; private insurance plans presumably can provide minimal
amounts of mental health care without leaving insureds without any alternatives. Frank and Mc-
Guire, 9 Health Care Affairs at 35 (cited in note 38). These public programs are underfunded and
very limited, however, and should be used primarily by those who cannot pay not by those persons
whose insurer has chosen not to cover mental illness. Moreover, since public health care systems
are intended primarily to provide care for the indigent, privately insured individuals may be de-
nied these resources. Several states, in fact, will not admit a patient to a state mental hospital if
the patient has any kind of insurance, even if the benefits are exhausted for the year. Rupp, 17
Schizophrenia Bull. at 403 (cited in note 10).
132. This argument applies to all disabled individuals as well as to those suffering mental
illness. See Jeanne Saddler, Bush's Lending Push, Disabilities Law Create Concerns, Wall St. J.
B2 (Oct. 16, 1991).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Findings and Purposes of the ADA).
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ket as a result of requiring greater benefits than those voluntarily
negotiated between employers and employees.1 34 These efficiency costs,
however, might be offset by reductions in direct state expenditures for
mental health.'1 5 If not, an increase in costs still may be justified be-
cause the current demand for mental health care insurance may be too
low from a social perspective.3 6 If an individual goes untreated because
of inadequate coverage, deterioration of the individual's job-related
skills and abilities eventually may lead to indigency. The deterioration
of job-related skills impairs job performance, which, if impairment is
severe enough, leads to unemployment and, eventually indigency. Thus,
even if the individual finally reaches the "safety net" of the public
mental health system, the fall probably will be very long and very pain-
ful.13' The individual also may fall through this net if not qualified to
receive public assistance, as many in this country are not.
Although application of the ADA to invalidate certain benefits lim-
itations would increase the proportion of the mentally ill covered by
private insurance and arguably would free up state resources, a large
percentage of the mentally ill still would go untreated. The ADA only
applies to health insurance obtained in the context of employment.
Since many of the mentally ill are unemployed, and probably incapable
of obtaining or holding jobs,'38 many of the people who most require
immediate care would not be covered. Furthermore, as previously
noted, many of the employed themselves are underinsured or not in-
sured at all.
C. Stigmatization and Prioritization in Health Care Funding
Interpreting the ADA to mandate equal benefits for mental health
care also resolves the problem of societal undervaluation of mental
health care, a problem which may contribute to the shortage of mental
health care funding. The low prioritization of mental health care re-
flected in current funding schemes may result from the same stigma
that causes individuals to undervalue mental health care. While most
people are willing to consider the possibility of becoming ill or suffering
an accident, the stigma associated with mental illness discourages many
134. See Frank and McGuire, 9 Health Care Affairs at 36-38 (cited in note 38).
135. Id. at 38-39.
136. Id. at 36.
137. Rupp, 17 Schizophrenia Bull. at 403 (cited in note 10).
138. The nature of several of the most severe mental illnesses would render most sufferers
unable to perform the essential functions of most jobs, even with reasonable accommodation.
Thus, employers would be permitted by the ADA to refuse to hire the mentally ill on that basis.
See notes 12-19 and accompanying text; 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) and (9). As demonstrated in the
process of deinstitutionalization, the funds supposedly freed by releasing patients from state hospi-
tals did not follow the patients. See notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
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people from giving serious consideration to the possibility that they
eventually may suffer from mental illness." 9 This stigma is particularly
prevalent in Anglo-American culture, which typically perceives mental
illness as resulting from a personality weakness or personal failing. 4 '
Americans place a high premium on individual autonomy, self-determi-
nation, and will-power. It is difficult to shed these cultural assumptions.
Many Americans do not understand why those with schizophrenia can-
not simply will themselves to recover.' A recent survey reported that
forty-three percent of Americans still view depression as a personal
weakness rather than a true health problem.'42 In addition, the people
most likely to oppose the placement of mental health care homes in
their communities are white, affluent, professional men who own homes,
a group that tends to believe in individual control and Social Darwin-
ism. " ' People who fail to exercise such "control" are stigmatized.
An additional reason why individuals tend to undervalue mental
health care is the belief that mental illness is chronic and incurable.
44
Such a belief probably originated in the time, only a few decades ago,
when little actually could be done to cure mental illness. 4 5 Modern psy-
chiatry, however, has made great strides in treatment, and most mental
illnesses can be treated with some degree of success.1
4 6
The personal and cultural stigma attached to mental illness may
hamper the effectiveness of legislation designed to solve the insurance
imbalance. " 7 For example, several states that mandate insurance cover-
age of mental health care have established minimum floors below those
mandated for other illnesses. " 8 State-mandated insurance benefits for
139. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
140. Statement of Janis Jenkins, Ass't Professor of Anthropology and Psychology, Case
Western Reserve University, quoted in Alison Bass, Illness Coupled with Stigma; Researchers See
a Cultural Bias Against Mental Disease, Boston Globe 1 (Feb. 3, 1992).
141. Id.
142. Survey conducted December 1991 by the National Mental Health Association, reported




146. See note 16 and accompanying text. See also Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets
at 20-21 (cited in note 1).
147. For example, President Bush's recent proposal for health care reform fails to ensure
adequate mental care, and may actually hurt state-sponsored reforms:
This plan entrenches stigma against the mentally ill. . . . By overriding state mental health
benefit mandates now in place, it is actually worse than no reform at all. This plan could
abandon patients and bankrupt their families. The President is sending the clear message to
all Americans who suffer mental illness: We do not care if you get the treatment you need.
Statement by Melvin Sabshin, M.D., Am. Psychiatric Ass'n Med. Director, quoted in Bush's
Health Care Proposal Leaves Mentally Ill in "Darkness", Psychiatric News 1, 11 (Mar. 6, 1992).
148. See, for example, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 175, § 47B (West, 1984) (mandating mini-
mum sixty days inpatient care per year and minimum $500 outpatient care per twelve-month pe-
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general health care actually may cause an overall reduction in coverage
for mental illnesses. Since mandating benefits likely will result in an
increase in the cost of health insurance, fewer employers, especially
small businesses operating on tight margins, may choose to offer any
form of health insurance.
149
Moreover, the undervaluation of health care will exist in any uni-
versal health care scheme, such as the Canadian plan, where health care
must be rationed by some representative body.150 Such plans do offer
the advantage of looking at the subjective and objective value of health
care in the aggregate, removing the variability of individuals.'15 The Ca-
nadian health care system and Oregon's proposed health care prioritiza-
tion scheme are examples of this approach. Oregon's plan, for example,
applies limited funds to a list of health care procedures prioritized in
terms of their health benefit by an independent board of physicians,
legislators, and citizens.'52 The state would not fund procedures for
which funds are not available.
153
While limited societal resources require some prioritization of
health care options and an allocation of health care resources, the dan-
ger is that the rationing will not be entirely rational. Like many individ-
uals, the Oregon allocation procedure and others like it may undervalue
mental health care. Both the stigma associated with mental illness and
the underestimation of the effectiveness of treatment can place mental
health care far down the prioritized list. 54 In fact, the use of the word
riod); Kansas Stat. Ann. § 40-2,105 (1986) (mandating minimum thirty days inpatient or
outpatient care and a minimum lifetime mental health benefit of $7,500). Some states require an
insurer to offer mental health coverage at least to the same extent and degree as coverage for
physical illnesses. See, for example, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304-17-318 (Michie 1988). As discussed
above, the insureds are unlikely or unwilling to recognize the need for mental health care coverage.
149. Michael Tanner, As Washington Dithers, State Reform Health Care, Heritage Found.
Rep., Backgrounder No. 868 (Nov. 1991). In order to make health insurance more affordable to
small businesses, many states are beginning to allow small employers to buy "bare bones" health
insurance. Id. This option usually means scrapping so-called "peripheral" benefits like mental
health care. Id.
150. Robert G. Evans, et al. Controlling Health Expenditures- The Canadian Reality, 320
New Eng. J. Med. 571 (1989).
151. See O'Neal, 43 Stan. L. Rev. at 439-40 (cited in note 95).
152. See id. at 439-40; Linda Williams, John Kitzhaber: Reforming Oregon's Health System
Long Before National Debate Began, L.A. Times M3 (Jan. 19, 1992). John Kitzhaber, president of
the Oregon State Senate, is one of the prime movers behind the Oregon health care plan.
153. O'Neal, 3 Stan. L. Rev. at 440 (cited in note 95).
154. Oregon has attempted to remove stigma from the prioritization process by focusing on
the end result of treatment, rather than on the treatment itself. A prioritization survey's descrip-
tion of the end result of mental health care, however, may fail to disguise adequately the nature of
the illness, or may be so general as to cover many different treatments. In the latter case, bias may
reassert itself through the committee that finally decides the ranking of treatments. Moreover, the
committee has the discretion to adjust the rankings regardless of the prioritization survey results.
See Special Project, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act: A Model for State Reform?, 45 Vand.
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"procedure" illustrates an inherent bias in the calculation towards rela-
tively short-term, acute care: the patient is treated and hopefully gets
better. In contrast, mental health care treatment can last for years, and
thus measuring its benefits can be more difficult. If society is to ade-
quately treat its mentally ill population, society and the representative
bodies allocating health care resources must recognize the existence of
subconscious influences tending towards undervaluation of mental
health care.
V. CONCLUSION
Public perception of mental illness-and the stigma associated
with it-perpetuates the inadequate medical treatment accorded the
mentally ill. This stigma can permeate any system of health care, be it
the current combination of public and private sources or the frequently
proposed uniform national health care. Any system with limited re-
sources requires making choices and prioritizing options. Failing to ob-
jectively evaluate mental health care, however, certainly will place it
artificially low on any list.
Mental health care may not be the top health care priority. It
should, however, be very high on any list. Mental health problems reach
across society, imposing costs including lost productivity, early death,
and the additional burden on society's resources. Many of the more
pressing problems today-homelessness, crime, and drug and alcohol
abuse-are connected to some extent to mental illness. Complete solu-
tions to these problems must provide for treatment for the mentally ill.
The family, the basic building block of American society, also is af-
fected by mental health problems. Families of the mentally ill often
bear the initial burden of care, and soon collapse under it.155 Mental
illness has more than one victim.
Beyond the economic cost-benefit analysis, society has certain
moral obligations towards the mentally ill. The process of deinstitution-
alization removed the mentally ill from situations in which they could
be treated. Although there were undeniable instances of abuse and mis-
treatment, the abuse mandated reform and better treatment, not neces-
sarily the cessation of all care. Society has not supported adequately
the hoped-for alternative of community-based treatment, breaking the
implied promise of better care. Instead of a bed-be it in a hospital or
community center-many of the mentally ill will sleep on a sidewalk
L. Rev. 977, part III.B (1992).
155. Isaac and Armat, Madness in the Streets at 249-83 (cited in note 1).
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grate tonight. Society owes it to these people, and to itself, to provide
adequate care.
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